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REENT CAsES
Conclusion
It seems very probable that the taxpayer had a sound basis for
claiming a deduction for his loss in Whitaker. It is submitted, however,
that there are more reasonable theories than the accelerated deprecia-
tion argument upon which he proceeded. The loss would seem to be
fully deductible either as a casualty loss or as a section 117(j) 30 loss,
except for the possibility, not discernible from the statement of facts
in the particular case, that taxpayer may have had gains from similar
involuntary conversion transactions against which he would have been
required to offset the loss.
Thomas L. Jones
ToRT-NEcIFENCE-MANuFAcruER's LL4IrrY-TmuMNAT1ON OF RisK-
The plaintiff, a four-year old boy, fell from a moving automobile when
the door came open. The plaintiff's mother had recently purchased the
automobile new from defendant dealer. The door from which the plain-
tiff fell was known to have a tendency to "bind" and it was often neces-
sary to slam it several times to latch it. Two other doors had previously
come open and the purchaser had taken the automobile to the dealer
for repair, but on neither occasion did she mention the "bind" in the
door from which the plaintiff fell. An action was brought against the
manufacturer and dealer alleging that the automobile was defective
and that the defendants were negligent in its manufacture and sale.
Evidence proved the automobile had been constructed with a warped
frame and defective locks. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
and from judgment entered thereon the defendants appealed on
grounds that they were entitled to a directed verdict. Held: reversed.
The purchaser, in continuing to operate the automobile daily with
knowledge that the doors could not be depended upon to function
properly, was negligent as a matter of law. This was an intervening
cause of the accident which relieved the defendants from liability. Ford
Motor Company v. Atcher, 310 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1957).
The Court of Appeals was faced with a problem of risk termination.
Risk termination is the extent to which the risk of harm caused by the
actor's negligence will render him liable for injuries caused thereby.
Specifically, the question before the court was whether the duty owed
to the plaintiff by the defendants was terminated by the negligence of
the purchaser in continuing to operate the automobile with knowledge
30 Now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.
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of defective doors.' In holding for the manufacturer, the court adopted
what may be considered the majority view.2 In support of its holding
the court cites four products liability cases: two Kentucky decisions,
Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer3 and Pullman Company v. Ward;4 a
Tennessee case, Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner;5 and a California de-
cision, Stultz v. Benson.6
The Olds Motor case restated the abandoned "general rule" that the
manufacturer was liable only if he had practiced deceit and concealed
a known defect. The Court allowed recovery to a plaintiff who had fal-
len from a defective seat, because there was no evidence that the
purchaser had knowledge of the defects. But the Court emphasized,
"[w]here the purchaser of an article knows that it is unsafe or danger-
ous, and with knowledge of this fact invites or permits a third party to
use it and the third party is injured, he cannot maintain an action for
tort against the maker."7 In Pullman Company v. Ward,s the Court
allowed recovery where an employee was injured when a defective
weld on the brakerod of a gondola car manufactured by the defen-
dant snapped, throwing the employee under the wheels of the car. The
weld had been painted so that it could not be detected. In a dictum
the court suggested that the manufacturer would not be liable if the
employer had knowledge of the defect. In both cases the dicta em-
ployed was appropriate to reasoning under the "general rule" where de-
ceit was necessary for recovery,9 although in the Olds Motor case the
court applied proximate cause theory as a second explanation for this
limitation.10
The court also found support for its holding in cases from Tennes-
see and California. In the Tennessee case, Ford Motor Co. v. Wagon-
I Whether the purchaser was actually negligent may be seriously questioned.
Obviously she did not appreciate the danger involved. It is doubtful whether the
conduct of a reasonable and prudent person would have differed substantially
from that of the purchaser. Assuming that the court did have reason for holding
the purchaser negligent as a matter of law, it was necessary to find the means
with which it could deny recovery to the innocent plaintiff. The negligence of the
mother could not be imputed to the child. Allegheny Coke Co. v. Massey, 163 Ky.
792, 174 S.W. 499 (1915); State Ry. Co. v. Herlotz, 104 Ky. 400, 47 S.W. 265(1898).
2 See notes 12-15 infra.
3 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911).
4148 Ky. 727, 137 S.W. 233 (1911).
5 183 Tenn. 892, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946).
06 Cal.2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936).
70lds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 621, 140 S.W. 1047, 1052. This
same language was used in the principal case. See Ford Motor Co. v. Atcher,
810 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ky. 1958).8143 Ky. 727, 137 S.W. 283 (1910).
9 Since the purchaser had knowledge of the danger or defects concealed
from him at purchase, the deceit was not the proximate cause of the injury.
10 Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 622, 140 S.W. 1047, 1053
(1911).
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er,' the plaintiff, owner of an automobile, was denied recovery for
injuries sustained in an accident caused as a result of the hood flying
open. The manufacturer had warned the original purchaser of the de-
fect and offered to correct it, but the automobile was sold to the plain-
tiff uncorrected. The defendant's warning was not passed on to' the
plaintiff. The court held that the negligence of the original purchaser
in selling the automobile without passing on the warning constituted
an intervening cause which could neither have been anticipated nor
foreseen, and which broke the causal connection between the original
wrong and the plaintiff's injury. In Stulz v. Benson,12 the California
court denied recovery to an injured workman who fell from a scaffold
which had been constructed with defective wood. The purchaser of
the lumber knew it was defective and constructing the scaffold with
such knowledge constituted an efficient cause of the injury.
The majority of cases from other jurisdictions are in line with the
principal case. Recent manufacturer cases following this view have
involved products of beverages, 13 poisonous insecticides,14 poisonous
cattle feed,15 and metal gas containers. 16 Generally the explanation of
these cases is similar to that of a recent federal court decision:
One who acts negligently is not bound necessarily to anticipate that
another person will be negligent after the latter has discovered the
danger arising from the former's negligence .... When the second
actor has knowledge and thereby brings about an accident, the first
actor is relieved of liability because the condition created by him
was merely a circumstance and not the proximate cause.17
Other jurisdictions following the majority view hold that any conscious.
intervening act will be an efficient cause relieving the negligent manu-
facturer from liability.18
Another line of products liability cases has developed a minority
view more consonant with the general principles of negligence. The
feature distinguishing the minority view is that where the manufacturer
or supplier can foresee that one with knowledge of the danger or de-
fects will permit others to use the defective article, the intervening
"1183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1936).
12 6 Cal.2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936).
' Jones v. Hartman Beverage Co., 29 Temn. App. 265, 203 S.W.2d 166
(1946). If there intervenes a conscious agency, which might or should haveaverted mischief, the original wrongdoer ceases to be liable. Ibid.
'
4 Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (court
merely held that evidence was sufficient for the jury).
'
5 Nishida v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957)(court affimed jury verdict for manufacturer).
'OParkinson v. California Co., 255 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1958) (directly in
line with the Wagoner case although involves peculiar propensities of product).
l7 Nishida v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours Co. 245 F.2d 768, 773 (5th Cir. 1957).
18 See Jones v. Hartman Beverage Co., 29 Tenn. App. 265, 203 S.W.2d 166
(1946).
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act is not necessarily an efficient cause relieving the defendant of lia-
bility.19 A Kentucky decision, Kentucky Independent Oil v. Schnitz-
ler,20 is one of the leading authorities for the rule. There the court held
the supplier liable for the death of the consumer of an explosive mix-
ture of gasoline and kerosene sold to the decendent as kerosene, even
though the retailer had been warned that the container contained the
mixture. The Court said, "[b]y the decided weight of authority the
first will be liable if he foresaw or ought to have foreseen the commis-
sion of the second's tort . . . ",21 The Court also said that the "mere
omission of a third person to interrupt the result of the defendant's act
will not amount to an efficient intervening cause so as to relieve de-
fendant from liability."2 2 This line of decisions follows more closely
the general principles of negligence which allow recovery for fore-
seeable consequences resulting from foreseeable intervening causes.
2 3
Recent cases supporting the minority view have involved products
such as a house trailer hitch,24 special cartridges used in shooting gal-
leries, 25 and aircraft. 26
Under the old "general rule," from which both views have evolved,
there was a distinction between products imminently dangerous and
those that were inherently dangerous.27 The Olds Motor case involved
a product thought to be "imminently" dangerous and therefore it was
necessary to find deceit as grounds for third parties to recover. If the
purchaser discovered the defect, there was no longer any concealment.
The Kentucky Independent Oil case involved an explosive mixture,
considered "inherently" dangerous and therefore recovery was per-
mitted on the basis of negligence, without a showing of deceit. It is no
longer necessary to make this distinction concerning the character of
the product.28 Under the modern rule all products liability cases are
governed by the general principles of negligence. 29 Thus, the existence
of two different views is merely the result of the variations and manner
19 Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 310, 282 P.2d 12 (1955).
20208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925).
21 Id. at 514, 271 S.W. at 573.
22 Id at 517, 271 S.W. at 575.23 Prosser, Torts § 49, at 266 (2d ed. 1955).24 Kothe v. Tysdale, 233 Minn. 163, 46 N.W.2d 233 (1951).25 Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., supra note 17.2 6 Vrooman v. Beach Aircraft Corporation, 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
27 Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911).
28 See Annot. 164 A.L.R. 371, 372 (1946).
29 The modem rule as found in the Restatement of Torts is "A manufacturer
who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which unless
carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing substantial bodily harm to those who lawfully use it for a purpose for which
it is manufactured and to those whom the supplier should expect to be in the
vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them
by its lawful use in the manner and for a purpose for which it is manufactured."
Restatement, Torts § 395 (1934).
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in which the several jurisdictions apply negligence and proximate cause
theory. Ironically the minority view, having its early development in
negligence, is more in accord with the majority of jurisdictions's ap-
plication of negligence and proximate cause theory.
The general rules governing "proximate cause" and "risk termina-
tion" are well defined in Kentucky. One of the early decisions, Watson
v. Kcntucky Indiana Bridge & R. Co.30 set a precedent which has
been followed with but slight variation. There the court said the
mere fact that the intervention was unforeseen will not relieve from
liability one guilty of primary negligence; but, if it is something so
unexpected or extraordinary that he could not or ought not to have
anticipated it, he will not be liable.3 1 The rule as stated in a recent case
is, "[i]f... the ultimate injury is brought about by an intervening act
or force so unusual as not to have been reasonably foreseeable, the
intervening act is considered as the superseding cause and the original
actor is not liable."3 2 Thus the determining factor in deciding whether
an intervening cause is efficient is whether it is reasonably foreseeable.
Determination of "proximate cause" is generally a question for the
jury. Only when reasonable men can reach but one logical determina-
tion of such question, may the court decide the question as a matter
of law.3 3 The court in our principal case may have thought that under
the facts only one reasonable determination was possible; but ap-
parently other jurisdictions applying the same general principles of
negligence have found that in similar situations it is a question on
which reasonable men may differ.3 4
The text authorites are not in complete agreement, but they appear
to support the minority view. Professor James strongly acclaims the
Kentucky Independent Oil case,35 and says that the rule limiting the
manufacturer's liability to a duty to warn is "a vestigial carryover from
pre-Macpherson days when deceit was needed for recovery."36 Dean
Prosser acknowledges the rule of the principle case to be the majority
law, and says it is in line with the older rules concerning manufacturer's
liability.37 However, he would qualify his opinion depending upon the
30137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910).
31 Id. at 633, 126 S.W. at 151.
32 Carr v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 301 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Ky. 1957). See Hines
v. Westerfield, 254 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1953); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Stevens, 298
Ky. 328, 182 S.W.2d 447 (1944); Kentucky Independent Oil v. Schnitzler, 208
Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 507 (1925).3 3 State Contracting & Stone Co. v. Fulkerson, 288 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1956);
Clardy v. Robinson, 284 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955); Routzahn v. Brown Hotel, 307
Ky. 548, 211 S.W. 2d 848 (1948); Berry v. Jorris, 303 Ky. 799, 199, S.W.2d 616(1947).
34 See Vrooman v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
35 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5, at 1542 (1956).
36 Id. § 28.5, at 1544.
3 7 Prosser, Torts § 84, at 504 (2d ed. 1955).
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degree of danger and the risk of harm.38 Professor Seavey takes a third
view. Considering proximate cause theory as a mere legalism to in-
dicate the presence or absence of liability, 9 he advocates the "risk
theory" of negligence. Under this theory the sole question is whether
the injury is within the risk,40 meaning a foreseeable injury to a fore-
seeable plaintiff. If the court had applied the "risk theory" to the fact
situation in the principal case, it probably would have permitted the
plaintiff to recover.41
The rule adopted by the court in essence limits the manufacturer's
liability to a duty to warn of defects, and if the purchaser or
user has knowledge of these defects, the manufacturer's duty is
terminated. If the court intends to use "proximate cause" in such
a manner as to protect industry as a special class, it is not in
line with present trends. Though knowledge of the danger or defect is
an important factor in determining whether the manufacturer's negli-
gence is the proximate cause of the injury, it should not be sufficient
in itself under all situations to relieve the manufacturer from liability.
Other factors also warrant the jury's consideration, such as: distance
in space and time, foreseeableness of harm and intervening causes,
the use to which the product is intended, the relationship of the user,
the change in condition of the product since its purchase, and the utili-
ty of the product versus the burden of making it safe. The present
case carries things too far, if the general law of negligence is to be ap-
plied. Under negligence principles the jury question should still be
whether an unreasonable hazard is to be anticipated from use of the
article, even though its dangerous condition has been drawn to the
attention of the purchaser. 42
K. Sidney Neuman
ToRT-AuTomoBr ms-REcovERY BY WIFE-PASSENGER AGAINST HuSBAND-
Divam-Shortly after the defendant-husband picked up his wife to take
her home after work one evening, a freezing rain fell and the roads be-
came slick. At approximately 2 a.m. on a "well shaded curve" the car
slid off the highway and turned over. The plaintiff-wife testified that
although the roads were hazardous, her husband, over her protests,
drove at the rate of 50-55 m.p.h. After her repeated requests for him to
38 Id. § 49, at 268.
39 Seavy, Cogitations on Torts 32 (1954).40 Ibid.
41 This is clearly a foreseeable injury to a foreseeable plaintiff. Thus, the
plaintiff could recover notwithstanding any possible intervening negligence of the
owner of the automobile.
422 Harper & James, Torts § 28.5, at 1542 (1956).
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